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bill has the same time after notice to, himself, for giving notice to
other parties beyond him, that was allowed to the holder after the
default. Sheldon vs. Benham, 4 Hill, N. Y. 129, 133; .Eage
Bank vs. Hathaway, 5 Metcalf, 213. And when a bill is sent to
an agent for collection, the agent is required simply to give notice
of the dishonor in due time to his principal; and the principal then,
has the same time for giving notice to the endorsers after such
notice from his agent, as if he had been himself an endorser receiv-
ing notice from a holder. Bank of the United State8 vs. Davis,
2 Hill's N. Y. R. 452. Church vs. Barlow, 9 Pick. 547. The
party in this case, therefore, was not at fault by sending the notice
directly to the Bank of Salem, leaving that bank to send the notice
to the plaintiffs in error.
Applying the rule, therefore, which we have adopted as the cor-
rect one, to this case, it was incumbent on the plaintiffs below, in
order to be entitled to a recovery, to show that the notice of the
dishonor of the bill, was deposited in the Post Office at Pittsburgh,
in time to be sent by the mail of the 28th day of July. Ten
minutes past nine o'clock in the morning, was not an unseasonably
early hour, or before a reasonable and convenient time after the
commencement of early business hours of the day. The neglect,
therefore, to send the notice by the mail of the next day after the
day of the default, operated to discharge the plaintiffa in errror as
endorsers, unless from some other cause, notice had been dispensed
with, or rendered unnecessary. And for the charge -of the Court
of Common Pleas to the jury to the contrary, the judgment is
reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
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Supreme Court of .Pennsylvania, Harrisburg, 1853.
Assignment to Creditors.-Where, in an assignment, some creditors are
preferred, it will not be implied, as against other creditors, that the pre.
ference extends to interest accruing after the date of the assignment.
Daniel Mans Appeal. LowRIE J.
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Death-Bed Gifts.-Where one on his death-bed expresses a wish to his
heir at law, that certain persons, whom he names, shall receive of his
estate specified articles and sums of money as gifts from him, and the heir
promises him that his request shall be fulfilled, the necessary implication
is, that the promise is to be performed after the death of the promisee,
and that the consideration is that the promissor shall succeed to his estate
under the intestate laws. The law implies the consideration from these
facts, and the consideration failing by disinheritance or otherwise, the
heir would be released.' Parker v. Urie's Executors. LEwis J.
Ececutors.-An executor cannot take a credit in his account for a debt
due to himself from the decedent, which was barred by the statute of
limitations, in the life-time of the testator. There having been no evidence
submitted to the auditor to whom the account was referred, which would
have authorized a recovery at law, it was his duty to have rejected the
credit. Bock's Appeals.
Evidence.-Evidence in support of the general character of witnesses
is not competent until their general character has been assailed. Every
witness puts his character in issue, but until evidence tending directly to
its impeachment is produced, the law presumes it to be good, and there-
fore testimony to prove it so is superfluous and irrelevant. Peter Mertz
v. Daniet May. WOODWARD J.
Execution.-Liability to distress, is the criterion for determining the
landlord's right to participate in the proceeds of a Sheriff's sale of goods
on execution. Where a creditor, whose debt was contracted after 4th July,
1849, seized his debtor's goods in execution, and on a claim of the benefits
of the exemption law, the appraisement amounted to less than $300, and
thereupon the Sheriff restored the goods to the debtor and returned his
execution, after which another creditor, whose judgment was founded on
a debt contracted before the 4th July, 1849, levied on the same goods and
sold them, and the money was brought into Court by the Sheriff, on a
notice from a landlord of the debtor, whose rent accrued subsequent to
4th July, 1849. Held, that the landlord had no right of distress in
respect to the goods, and therefore no footing in Court on a question of
distribution of proceeds. Paltiall S. Rowland v. John Goldsmith.
WOODWARD J.
Equity.-Interrogatories, though not indispensible to a bill in equity,
become a material part of it, when founded on matter contained in the
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charging part of the will, and such interrogatories the defendant is com-
pelled to answer. Facts alleged in answer, not responsive to plaintiff's
interrogatories, but in evidence of his will, must be proved by the defend-
ant; but if they be responsive, the plaintiff must overcome the two wit-
nesses, or equivalent evidence. The opgration of the defendant's answer
is the same, though the equity of the plaintiff's will is grounded on an
allegation of fraud. By WOODWARD J., in 11'enje's Executors v. Groff
& Grof. LEwis J. dissenting.
Executor- Cornpensation-Accouts.-Where an executor or other
trustee settles his accounts in Court with undue frequency, the remedy is
in the Court to impose the costs on him. Spangler's Appeal. Low=xE J.
'Where one-third of the residue of an estate is bequeathed to be invested
by the.executors, who are to pay the interest to the widow during life, the
executors are entitled to compensation out of the income, for their serviecs
in administering the fund. ibid.
All kinds of trustees are entitled to a reasonable compensation for their
services as they are rendered, and, unless a contrary intentiou appears, the
compensation must come out of the income of the fund with which they
are entrusted. Solliday v. .Bissett, 12 Penn. St. R. 347, on this point
commented on. Ibid.
Praud-Practice.-If a creditor, knowing that his debtor is in failing
circumstances, takes from him, for part of his claim, a mortgage substan-
tially covering all his property, and gets the debtor to obtain the endorse-
ment of another person for another part, -without revealing the fact of the
mortgage, this is fraud upon the endorser, and discharges him from lia-
bility. Lancaster County Bank vs. Albright. LowmI. J.
Where persons, assuming to act. for another in securing a claim, are
guilty of fraud in the transaction, the creditor must go back to his old
position if he would repudiate the fraud of the new arrangement. ibid.
A general prayer for a charge that there is no evidence of a particular
fact is not good practice. A better way is to call on the opposite counsel
to indicate in writing the evidence relied on, and the Court may, in a pro-
per case, enforce the demand; and then the question will be one of shape
and body on which a well refined instruction can be given. Ibid.
A prayer for the Court to charge the jury that there is evidence, from
which a particular fact may be inferred, ought to point out the special
facts which justify the inference. Ibid.
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.Hwsand and Wif .Partition-A of 1848.-Where land is. held in
common by a married woman and others, and they all join in a- partition,
and her share is conveyed to her and her husband, the law considers the
share as still her's, a divided sham tieing substituted for an undivided one.
SeAman . H bdw. Lowu J...
If the husband has paid money for owd4 of partition of the wife's
land, and the conveyance be made to him and his wife, he acquires an
interest in common with her, in proportion to the amount paid. Ibid.
When the husband conveys, in fraud Qf creditors, his life estate in land
held in right of his wife, the creditors may levy on the growing crops as
* et. -, id.
-" ,.ha maxrled woman act of 1848, was not intended to take away the
ypted rights of the husband, and does not allow him to give them away
I' fraud of Iis creditors, even to his wife. bid.
-. eatate.W. E. died leaving a widow and three daughters. J. E.,
'his brother', married the widow and had by her a daughter Elizabeth, and
fiead itesat seized of real estate which he had purchased. After.this,
ljtbe&t died intestate, and unmarried. Hr0d, that the widow, though
eapable 4 .beffng the heir of Elizabeth, could not take the fee in the land
because she was not of the blood of her husband, from. whom the estate
descended to Elizabeth, and that the 6th section of the statute of descents
of 8th April, 1833, admitted the half sisters to the inheritance, in pre-
ference to more remoto -kindred of the whole blood. Any, the smallest
quantity of common blood with the ancestor from whom the estate
descended, is sufficient to qualify heirs to take, and in nieces there is no
lack of inheritance blood. Nary Lines and others v. .PNiIIfp .Brown.
WooDwARD 3.
Ifants.-The right to command the services and recover the wages of
a minor son, being in the father, when he makes a contract for them,
there is no ground for presuming that he is acting as agent for his son ; or
that the other person knows it, and therefore the law does not presunie it.
Kau~ffet v. Mode~rel, Lowr J.
The right of action for the wages, in such case, is in the father. Rid.
Judgment.-Where a judgment is given for a sum certain, but really to
cover liabilities incurred and advances to be made, if record notice of the
amount actually due, before the intervening rights of lien, creditors have
attached such judgment, has priority of lien, to the extent of the advances
actually made or liabilities incurred. Kunnybacher v. Chares. Kox J.
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Landlord and Tenant.-Where the owner in fee of lands encumbered
by a mortgage, entered into an article of agreement by which another was
to occupy the lands for life, for which the occupant was to pay the annual
interest to the mortgagee, and also to pay quarterly to the owner, the
interest on all siuns which he had or should thereafter pay on the purchase
of the land. It wag held that the occupant was the tenant of the owner,
and that payment of the interest might be enforced by distress. Raad
,i. Kitchen. KNox J.
Lands-Evidence.-A mark on the land, intended as a measure of the
height of a dam, is not such a boundary mark as can be proved by repu-
tation, so as to effect the rights of owners of land affected by the dam.2
Schuylkill Navigation Company v. Robeson. Low J.
Lunatics.-The 45th section of the act of 13th June, 1836, relating to -
lunatics or habitual drunkards, authorizes the service, of writs against
lunatics on committees, but before the writ issues, there. should be a sug-
gestion, of record of the inquisition of lunacy and of the name of the
Committee. A writ against a lunatic, without such suggestion, and served
ou a man whom the Sheriff, in his return, called trustee, is simply a writ
against one, and service on another, which justifies a judgment against
neither. Laird v. .Hling. WooDwARD J.
Mechanics' Lien.-Where the structure of a building is so completely
changed, that, in common parlance, it may be properly called a new build-
ing, or a re-building, it comes within the Mechanics' Lien Law. Arm-
strong vs. Ware. LowmrE, J.
Where every part of an old building is removed, except the back wall
and part of the side wallsand in them the openings are changed; altering
the whole internal structure and external form of the building, and add-
ing both to its height and length; such a building is the subject of a
Mechanics' Lien. Ibid.
Nuncupative Will-Legacy- Witness.-Though a legatee may release
or renounce a legacy, and thus become a competent witness to prove a
will, yet he cannot make himself competent by assigning his interest to
another. The contrary doctrine, in Search's appeal, 13 State R. 108,
overruled. Haus v. Palmer. Low=xn J.
The appearance of two disinterested persons as witnesses, at the making
of a nuncupative will, is necessary to its validity. Ibid.
It is necessary to the validity of a nuncupative will, that each of its
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requisites be very clearly proved by two witnesses, to wit: its substance,
the intent to will, the rogatio test urn, and the necessity that prevents its
being reduced to writing. bid.
The general rule requiring all wills to be in writing, is intended to be
as nearly universal as possible, and the exception in favor of nuncupative
wills must be very strictly administered, and confined to cases of necessity.
Ignorance of the general rule, or carelessness about attending to it when
the testator is conscious that his sickness is unto death, or mere aversion
to be troubled about it, does not constitute such necessity. Ibid.
On an issue to try the validity of a nuncupative will, the declaration
ought to contain the substance of the will offered to be proved, or it ought
to appear somewhere as part of the record. Ibid.
Orphans Court.-An administrator who settles his account before
auditors in the Orphans' Court, and suffers a final decree of distribution
to pass, without alleging payments made to one of the distributees, (which
he denies), cannot, a year afterwards, come in by means of a bill of review,
and make the alleged payments ground of fresh litigation or more delay.
.Tdebeitle's AppeaL WooDwA.D J.
Partnersp--Assignment.-Three successive partnerships existed; the
first composed of five brothers, the second of three, and the last of two;
the two last firms having bought out, respectively, the interests of the
retiring partners. At the purchase made by the second firm, they agreed
with the two retiring partners to pay the partnership debts of the second
firm. At the purchase made by the second firm, there was no evidence
of any such agreement with the retiring partners, respecting the creditors
of the two preceding firms. The last firm made an assignment of the
assets, in trust for its own partnership debts. Held, that the creditors of
the first and second firm had no lien on the property; by the sales of the
retiring partners, it became vested in the last firm, and might be disposed
of for the payment of all its debts, without preferences. Such assign-
ment, although the creditors of the two first firms, as well as individual
creditors, were excluded, is not forbidd6n by the act of 1843. Yearsley's
Estate. LFwis J.
The preference which partnership creditors have in the distribution of
partnership assets, is founded on no equity of their own, but on the equity
of the partners themselves, and must be worked out through them.
Where they make a different disposition of the property, in good faith, the
preference is at an end. Ibid.
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An agreement by the second firm, in consideration of the sale of the
interest of the two retiring partners, to pay all the debts of the first firm,
created no lien on the property, and the. subsequent transfer of it to the
last firm, without any such agreement respecting the debts of the tw6
preceding firms, took away all pretence for saying that the partnership
creditors of the two first became, by transfer, creditors of the last. ]Id.
The distribution of the assets among the creditors of the last firm w a
correct. Ibid.
Partnership.-Where the plaintiff alleged a leasing of a lot from a'
and the defendant was permitted to give evidence of plaintiff's declara-
tions, tending to show that the leasing was from one member of the firm,
as his separate property, it was competent for the plaintiff to prove, iu
rebutting, that the lot belonged to the firm, and not to the partner.
Moderwell v. Mullison. WOODWARD J.,
And if the lot were partnership property, and used as such, the lease,'
though made by one partner in his own name, would enure to the benefit
of the firm. Ibid.
When real estate is brought into the partnership business, it is treated
in equity as personal estate, and a lease of it by one partner, is as much
a partnership transaction as a sale of partnership goods by him would be.
ibid.
Statute of _Frauds-Evidence.-In an action of ejectment, to enforce
a final contract for the sale of lands, it is the duty of the Court to hold
the plaintiff to strict proof; and mere instructions to the jury as to what
is required, is not the limit of the authority of the Judge presiding at the
trial. He must see to it that the -correct result is produced. WTethertl
v. Wetlerill. KNox J.
The declarations or admissions of a grantor made to a stranger, may be
received as corroborative evidence, but standing alone, are not sufficient to
establish a contract for the sale or gift of lands. Ibid.
Sheriff.-A Sheriff is not liable for interest on money collected by him
on execution, until after demanded, and a rule on him to pay the money
into Court, where there is a dispute among the execution creditors, cannot
be regarded as equivalent to a demand,'even though he does not account
for the disposition bf the money in the meantime. .antz v. Common-
wealth. Lowinr J.
A Sheriff is not bound to take notide of a-rule not served on him. Ibid.
Obedience to such a rule is to be enforced by attachment, and not by
an action claiming interest for his disobedience. 1bW.
A-67
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Taxes-Boreign Law-Domicil.-The general principle that personal
property is to be taxed according to the law of the owners domicil; and
real estate according to the place where it is situated, has been somewhat
changed by statute; but no alteration has been made which authorizes
the collection of collateral inheritance tax where neither the property to
be- taxed nor the domicil of the owner was within the State at the time
-of his death. Commonwealth vs. Stewart's E'xr.-IIEwIs, J.
*Where the testator was domiciled in Cuba at the time of his death, the
"universal heir" constituted, according to civil law, is under no necessity
to apply to our laws for aid in obtaining possession of that part of the
estate which is situated in that Island; and the legatees may enforce
their claims against him there according to the laws of Spain. In such
cas e, legacies, "payable out of the crops of a sugar plantation" there, are
not subject to the collateral inheritance tax here. Ibid.
The domicil of orin continues until it is changed by acquiring one
elsewhere; but where a man removes to a foreign country, settles-himself
there, and engages in the trade of the country, the presumption in favor
of the continuance of the domicil of origin ceases, and the burthen of dis-
proving the domicil of choice is lost upon him who denies it. Ibid.
Neither investments nor commercial enterprises in, nor occasional visits
on business or pleasure to his native country, will in such case work a'
change of domicil. Nor will a desire to be buried there, and the execu-
tion of that wish by his executor, have that effect. Ibid.
By the civil law, strangers can make no disposition of their property in
view of death; and where a man professes the Roman Catholic religion,
and receives letters of naturalization in a country whose laws require both
as a condition upon which the privilege of testamentary dsposition is
granted, these solemn professions of religious faith and political allegiance
are too decisive to be repelled by slight evidence. i1i.
Even if these professions were falsely made for the purpose of evading
the laws of the foreign government, it is contrary to that elevated rule of
morality which regulates the conduct of civilized nations, for this com-
monwealth to claim advantage from a fraud thus perpetrated by one of her
own citizens upon a friendly nation. Rbid.
The acquisitions in-Cuba, and the right to dispose of them by will hav-
ing been gained by these professions, so far as regards that part of the
estate, the commonwealth and all others who claim advantage from it, are
bound by them. Rid.
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Trust-Parol Evidence.-Oral evidence that at the time of a convey-
ance, the vendee agreed to hold the title in trust for the vendor, is inadmis-
sible as a contradiction of a written instrument. Therefore, where a man
conveys land to another by deed, and afterwards enters into an agreement
with with his vendee, by which he is to reside on the land and farm it for
the vendee, and does so for several years, apparently under such agree-
ment, he will not be allowed to defend his possession against his vendee,
by oral testimony that his conveyance was made in trust for himself.
Porter v. Mayfidd. LowRIE J.
WNil-Legacy.-Where a testator devised the residue of his estate to
his grand-children equally, per capita, describing them as follows, viz.:
"The children of my deceased daughter Sarah; the child of my deceased
daughter Catharine," &c., &c. Catharine had two children living at the
death of the testator, and at the date of the will. Beld that both were
entitled to take as residuary legatees. Urie's Executors v. Jenin and
wife. KNox J. a
Witls.-A testator, by his last will, ordered his executors to sell his
real estate, and, after payment of debts and legacies, to pay the residue
to his ", eight children," but, "if any of my children above named should
die before receiving their share, without leaving lawful issue, then said
share to be equally divided among the survivors." The executor settled
his administration account in the Orphans' Court, ascertaining the dis-
tributive share of each child, and on the 3d September, 1851, the Court
decreed distribution of the fund in his hands, "according to the will."
In January following, Elizabeth, one of the children, died, having first
made a will, devising her whole estate. The executor of the father's will
paid over her distributive share to her executor, and then instituted this
action to recover it back. Hfeld, that from the time of the decree of the
Orphans' Court, the distributive share of Elizabeth was fully vested in
her as her absolute property; that the executor held it in trust for her,
and that his reception and possession of it enured to her benefit, and,
under the circumstances, amounted to a receiving of it by her, within the
meaning of her father's will, and consequently that it passed by her will,
and the payment made by the father's executor to her's was properly
made, and could ndt be recovered back. John Cessna, Executor, v. S. L.
Rupel, Executor. WOODWARD J. •
